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Abstract 
The introduction of universal suffrage for the selection of the Hong Kong Chief 
Executive is often portrayed as the answer to the problems afflicting the executive-
legislative relationship in Hong Kong.  But even in the increasingly unlikely event 
that a consensus can be reached on the necessary electoral methods, the introduction 
of universal suffrage would, by itself, do little to address some of the structural 
problems that spring from the strong system of separation of powers—and, 
particularly, separation of persons—that exists under the Hong Kong Basic Law. 
The near total separation of membership of the executive and legislature in Hong 
Kong weakens the political party system and creates the potential for deadlock 
between the two branches of the political structure. Such structural issues will need to 
be addressed alongside the introduction of universal suffrage. 
If the introduction of a parliamentary system is considered too radical a solution in 
Hong Kong, such reforms should instead focus on finding the maximum cross 
membership possible within the present constitutional structure, and improving 
channels of communication between the executive and legislature. Such reforms 
would also offer hope for addressing some of the problems currently afflicting the 
executive-legislative relationship in Hong Kong, even if consensus cannot be reached 
on the introduction of universal suffrage. 
 
Introduction 
Separation of powers has long been a “controversial” and “politically charged” issue 
in Hong Kong.1 Hong Kong is quite possibly the only jurisdiction in the world where 
the local courts and representatives of the sovereign power that enacted its 
constitutional document are fundamentally at odds over whether or not such a system 
currently exists under the local constitutional framework. Ever since former leader 
Deng Xiaoping’s 1987 warning against adopting a “separation of the three powers”,2 
Chinese officials have repeatedly denied the existence of such a system under the 
Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic 
of China (or “Hong Kong Basic Law”).3  
                                                 
1
 C.L. Lim and Johannes Chan, “Autonomy and Central-Local Relations” in Johannes Chan and C.L. 
Lim (eds.), Law of the Hong Kong Constitution (Hong Kong: Sweet & Maxwell, 2011) at page 45. 
2
 Deng Xiaoping, “Speech at a Meeting with the Members of the Committee for Drafting the Basic 
Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region”, 16 April 1987 in Deng Xiaoping on the 
Question of Hong Kong (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1993) at page 55. 
3
 For a recent example, see Hao Tiechuan, “HK system not tripartite,” China Daily (HK edition), 1 
November 2013 at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hkedition/2013-11/01/content_17072822.htm (last 
accessed on 27 August 2014). 
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By contrast, the Hong Kong courts have repeatedly held that the Hong Kong 
Basic Law “enshrines” the principle of separation of powers.4 Hong Kong’s Chief 
Justice Geoffrey Ma recently repeated this point in a public lecture, explicitly stating 
that: “The prescribed constitutional model for Hong Kong involves the separation of 
powers”.5 In Yau Kwong Man v Secretary for Security (2002), the Court of First 
Instance even struck down a statutory provision on the grounds that it infringed this 
fundamental principle that the court held enshrined in the Hong Kong Basic Law.6 
Separation of powers can take many forms and, in holding that such a system is 
enshrined in the Hong Kong Basic Law, the courts have offered little guidance as to 
what form such separation takes in Hong Kong, beyond brief references to a tripartite 
division of powers between the executive, legislature and judiciary 7 and highly 
debateable assertions this is based on “the Westminster model”.8 Any more 
comprehensive definition of separation of powers needs to embrace several different 
elements. Vile (1998),9 author of what is often described as the “classic study” on the 
subject,10 suggests that a “pure” system of separation of powers includes the 
following four elements: 
• Division of government into three separate branches: Executive, legislature and 
judiciary; 
• Classification of all governmental functions as executive, legislative or judicial 
functions with each of these functions normally entrusted to the “proper” branch 
of government; 
• Separation of persons: The three branches are composed of separate and distinct 
groups of people with no overlapping membership between them; 
• Checks and balances between the three branches to avoid any one branch 
exercising arbitrary power.11 
                                                 
4
 Lau Cheong v HKSAR (2005) 5 HKCFAR 415, 447 (CFA). See also Lau Kwok Fai v Secretary for 
Justice (unrep., HCAL 177 and 180/2002, [2003] HKEC 711 at para. 19)(CFI) where separation of 
powers was described as a principle that “is woven into the fabric of the Basic Law”. 
5
 Geoffrey Ma Tao-li, “University Assembly - A Respect for Rights and a Respect for the Rights of 
Others”, Speech at Lingnan University, 17 March 2014 at 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201403/17/P201403170582.htm (last accessed on 27 August 2014). 
6
 [2002] 3 HKC 457, 470 and 479 (CFI) holding that s67C of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap. 
221) was invalid because it bestowed on the Chief Executive “the power to exercise what is an 
inherently judicial power” and so infringed Article 80 of the Hong Kong Basic Law. 
7
 For example, Lau Cheong at 447. See also Lau Kwok Fai at para. 17,  where Hartmann J. referred to 
“the principle that the primary functions of law making, law executing and law adjudicating are to be 
distinguished from each other”. 
8
 See Yau Kwong Man at 469 and Lau Kwok Fai at para. 18. The reference to the Westminster model 
(which emphasizes the role of Parliament in government) in the Hong Kong context has been criticised 
by Wesley-Smith [in “Judges and Judicial Power under the Hong Kong Basic Law” (2004) 34 HKLJ 
83, 84] as “a misnomer here”. See also Lo Pui Yin, The Judicial Construction of Hong Kong’s Basic 
Law (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2014) at page 36. 
9
 M.J.C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2nd 
edition, 1998). 
10
 See, for example, Richard Bellamy, “The Political Form of the Constitution: the Separation of 
Powers, Rights and Representative Democracy” in Richard Bellamy (ed.), The Rule of Law and the 
Separation of Powers (Burlington: Dartmouth, 2005) at page 254. 
11
 Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (see note 9) at pages 14-19. 
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These divisions are rarely absolute and, in most jurisdictions practising a system 
of separation of powers, there is usually some limited overlap between the executive, 
legislature and judiciary. That is particularly true of checks and balances which, at 
least in the sense in which the term is generally understood today, involve breaking 
down the barriers between the three branches of government to the extent necessary to 
provide some check or balance on any one branch abusing its powers.12 To take just 
one example, the executive’s power to veto bills passed by the legislature inevitably 
involves limited inroads by the executive into the legislative process. 
The same is true of separation of persons, another area where there is often some 
overlap, at least between the membership of the executive and legislature. That is 
certainly true under a parliamentary system of government, such as in the United 
Kingdom, where the membership of the upper echelons of the executive is—by 
definition—drawn from the ranks of the legislature. So to deny the existence of any 
overlapping membership is to deny the existence of any form of separation of powers 
in any country with a parliamentary system of government, a view which—although it 
enjoyed some academic support in the past13—has now been firmly rejected by the 
English courts.14 
In the absence of a requirement for total separation, it is the degree of separation 
between executive, legislature and judiciary which distinguishes different systems of 
separation of powers. Although even in a parliamentary system the majority of 
members of the legislature remain outside the ranks of the executive,15 the degree of 
overlap which does exist is often credited with averting perennial deadlock between 
the executive and legislature. And it is the absence of such overlapping membership 
under the Hong Kong system which merits particularly close attention, in considering 
the likely impact of universal suffrage and other possible reforms to Hong Kong’s 
political system. 
 
                                                 
12
 Ibid. at pages 19-20. This is sometimes also described as an amalgam of the doctrine of separation of 
powers with the theory of checks and balances. 
13
 See, for example, O. Hood Phillips, “A Constitutional Myth: Separation of Powers” (1977) 93 Law 
Quarterly Review 11, 11. 
14
 See, in particular, Lord Diplock’s statement that “it cannot be too strongly emphasised that the 
British constitution, though largely unwritten, is firmly based on the separation of powers” in Dupont 
Steels Ltd. v Sirs [1980] 1 All ER 529, 541. 
15
 In the UK for instance, Section 2 of the House of Commons Disqualification Act 1975 limits to a 
maximum of 95 the number of members of the House of Commons who are allowed also to be 
government ministers. 
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Separation of Powers under the Hong Kong Basic Law 
Perhaps due to political sensitivities, there is no explicit reference to separation of 
powers in the Hong Kong Basic Law. Its drafters did use the term during the early 
stages of the drafting process. Davis (1989) notes that drafters initially came out 
strongly in favour of “a somewhat American style of separation of powers with 
checks and balances”.16 In its first progress report in late 1986, the Political Structure 
Sub-group of the Basic Law Drafting Committee clearly stated that:  “The Group 
considers that, under the principle of ‘one country two systems’, in principle the 
political structure of HKSAR will adopt the model of ‘separation of powers’.”17 
That changed after a speech by Deng Xiaoping to Basic Law drafters a few 
months later. China has long harboured strong ideological objections to the whole 
concept of separation of powers, which classical Marxist theory rejects as a 
“constitutional fallacy” that ignores the class nature of society.18 The constitutional 
principle of governance in China is instead one of “democratic centralism”19 and 
Chan (2007) describes the rejection of separation of powers as a “major characteristic 
of the Chinese legal system”.20 
Whatever the motivation for his April 1987 warning against adopting a 
“separation of the three powers” in Hong Kong,21 Deng’s speech to Basic Law 
drafters put an end to any further explicit references to separation of powers—
although not checks and balances, a term which continued to be used by mainland 
drafters.22 One drafter and senior mainland official was quoted shortly afterwards as 
stating, “we should not talk about separation of the three powers any more to avoid 
misunderstanding”.23 Hao (2013) notes that “the term was never mentioned again in 
official deliberations of the drafting process or the Basic Law itself”.24  
Instead the term “executive-led government”, which particularly emphasises the 
powers of the Chief Executive, subsequently began to be promoted as China’s 
preferred alternative description of Hong Kong’s constitutional structure, although 
only after the drafting of the Hong Kong Basic Law had been completed.25 In 
principle, a system of executive-led government is not necessarily incompatible with 
                                                 
16
 Michael C. Davis, Constitutional Confrontation in Hong Kong (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989) at 
page 31. 
17
 Progress Report of the Sub-Group on Political Structure (8 November 1986). 
18
 Hal Draper, Karl Marx’s Theory of Revolution (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977) at page 
316. 
19
 Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China 1982. 
20
 Johannes Chan, “Basic Law and Constitutional Review” (2007) 37 HKLJ 407, 408. 
21
 Perhaps because they contradicted the stance of the drafters, Deng’s remarks on separation of powers 
were so sensitive that they were initially omitted from the officially published text of his speech to 
Basic Law drafters, although they were subsequently published in full. See Yau Shing Mu, “Deng’s 
words prompt new look by drafters”, Hong Kong Standard, 18 April 1987 and.Deng , “Speech at a 
Meeting with the Members of the Committee for Drafting the Basic Law (see note 2) at page 55.  
22
 See, for example,  Xiao Weiyun, One Country, Two Systems: An Account of the Drafting of the Hong 
Kong Basic Law (Beijing: Peking University Press, English edition, 2001) at page 245. 
23
 Li Hou, deputy director of the State Council’s Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office,cited in Chris 
Yeung, “Change of view by top official”, South China Morning Post, 9 June 1987. 
24
 Hao, “HK system not tripartite,” (see note 3). This English translation uses the term “tripartite 
political system” rather than “separation of the three powers”. 
25
 The origins of this term appear to date back to the mid-1990s. See further Lo, The Judicial 
Construction of Hong Kong’s Basic Law (see note 8) at pages 40-46. 
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one of separation of powers, and that point is sometimes made by mainland 
scholars.26 But it appears Chinese officials remain concerned that, even if dominance 
by the executive is accepted, acceptance of any form of separation of powers would 
still risk undermining its control over developments in Hong Kong through the Chief 
Executive who, in contrast to the legislature and the judiciary, is directly accountable 
to Chinese Central Authorities.27 Hao (2013) warns that a system of separation of 
powers, “would mean that instructions from the central government can be challenged 
by LegCo and/or the High Court”.28  
However, as Ghai (1999) notes: “The doctrine of the separation of powers can 
accommodate many configurations of the relationship among state institutions.”29 
According to Lutz (2006), who has sought to measure such separation through a 
Separation of Powers Index, almost all political systems use separated powers to some 
extent,30 although the extent of such separation varies greatly, along what he describes 
as a “separation of powers continuum”.31 
Given this broad ambit of the doctrine, it is difficult to deny that the arrangements 
under the Hong Kong Basic Law fall somewhere within the “many configurations”32 
that come within the scope of separation of powers. That is certainly the stance taken 
by the Hong Kong courts,33 and also by many scholars in Hong Kong. Wesley-Smith 
was one of the first to make this point, writing in 1990 that, “the structure of the Basic 
Law and its allocation of functions to the Legislative Council, the Chief Executive 
and the courts is very similar to the structure of other constitutions said to exhibit the 
separation of powers”.34 More than a decade later, he put the point more strongly, 
writing in 2005 that “it seems impossible to argue that the Basic Law does not clearly 
establish three separate branches of government each with specified powers in 
accordance with the separation doctrine”.35 
That conclusion is based primarily on the separate sections in Chapter IV of the 
Hong Kong Basic Law on Political Structure, which allocate separate and distinct 
powers to the three branches that constitute an integral feature of the conventional 
                                                 
26
 See, for example, Chen Xinxin, “A Study on Hong Kong’s Executive-led System” in One Country 
Two Systems Research Institute, Seminar on Review and Prospect of the Basic Law: Collection of 
Articles 2007 (Hong Kong, 2010) at page 281. See also Lo, The Judicial Construction of Hong Kong’s 
Basic Law (see note 8) at pages 47-48. 
27
 See, for example, the comments of Chen Zuoer, Deputy Director of the Hong Kong and Macao 
Affairs Office of the State Council, at a seminar in Beijing on 12 March 2004. Cited by Albert H.Y. 
Chen in “Executive-led Government, Strong and Weak Governments and Consensus Democracy” in 
Chan and Harris (eds.) Hong Kong’s Constitutional Debates (Hong Kong Law Journal Limited, 2005) 
at page 10. 
28
 Hao, “HK system not tripartite” (see note 24). 
29
 Yash Ghai, Hong Kong’s New Constitutional Order: The Resumption of Chinese Sovereignty and the 
Basic Law (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2nd edition, 1999) at page 263. 
30
 Donald S. Lutz, Principles of Constitutional Design (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 
at page 109. 
31
 Ibid. at page 123. 
32
 Ghai (1999). See note 29. 
33
 See note 4 earlier. 
34
 Peter Wesley-Smith, “The Separation of Powers” in Wesley-Smith (ed.) Hong Kong’s Basic Law: 
Problems and Prospects (Hong Kong: Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong, 1990) at page 72. 
35
 Peter Wesley-Smith, “The Hong Kong Constitutional System: The Separation of Powers, Executive-
Led Government and Political Accountability” in Chan and Harris (eds.), Hong Kong’s Constitutional 
Debates (see note 27) at pages 3-4. 
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tripartite system of separation of powers. The executive, led by the Chief Executive, is 
assigned a long list of powers under the Hong Kong Basic Law,36 including 
responsibility for the implementation of laws.37 But the Hong Kong Basic Law places 
responsibility for law-making in the hands of the legislature, as part of another long 
list of powers assigned to Legco.38 There is less detail on the power of the courts. But 
the Hong Kong Basic Law does assign to the courts responsibility for “exercising the 
judicial power of the [Hong Kong Special Administrative] Region”.39 
Checks and balances are also present in abundance throughout the Hong Kong 
Basic Law. While only the legislature can enact primary legislation, the Chief 
Executive has the power to veto any bills passed by the legislature,40 a power similar 
to that exercised by the leaders of the executive branch in most countries with a 
presidential system of government, such as the US. As in the US, the Chief 
Executive’s veto of a bill passed by the legislature may be overridden by a two-thirds 
majority of legislators, although the Hong Kong Basic Law’s provisions on this are 
more complex than those in the US Constitution, since it gives the Chief Executive 
the alternative of instead dissolving the legislature and calling fresh elections.41  
As a result, many scholars characterise the system of separation of powers that 
exists under the Hong Kong Basic Law as one which, in the words of Ghai (1999), 
“owes more to the presidential system than the parliamentary system”.42 More 
specifically, the system under the Hong Kong Basic Law is often characterised as one 
which bears a strong resemblance to the separation of powers practised under the US 
Constitution.  For instance, Wesley-Smith (1990) notes that: “In some respects the 
model for the SAR’s political system seems to have been found in the USA”.43 Shiu 
(2010), who served as Deputy Secretary General of the Basic Law Consultative 
Committee suggests that, “the internal operation of Hong Kong’s political system is 
quite similar to the American executive-legislative relations”.44 
That resemblance is particularly striking in the area of separation of persons 
where, as in the US, the Hong Kong system inclines in the direction of near total 
separation of persons between the executive and legislature. Even if a legislator is 
                                                 
36
 Articles 48 and 62. 
37
 Article 48(2). 
38
 See Article 73 and, especially, Article 73(1). 
39
 Article 80. 
40
 Under Article 76, any bill passed by Legco “may take effect only after it is signed and promulgated 
by the Chief Executive”. Under Article 49, instead of signing and promulgating a bill, the Chief 
Executive may instead return to Legco “for reconsideration” any bill which the Chief Executive 
considers “not compatible with the overall interests of the Region”. 
41
 Under Articles 49 and 50, if Legco passes by a two-thirds majority any bill returned for 
reconsideration, the Chief Executive must either sign and promulgate it or dissolve Legco and call 
fresh elections. However dissolving Legco is an extremely risky path unlikely to appeal to many Chief 
Executives since, under Article 52(2), he will then be forced to resign if the new Legco again passes 
the bill by a two-thirds majority and he still refuses to sign it. 
42
 Ghai, Hong Kong’s New Constitutional Order (see note 29) at page 263. For further characterisations 
of the Hong Kong system as a presidential system, see also Ma Ngok, “Executive-Legislative 
Relations: Assessing Legislative Influence in an Executive-Dominant System,” in Lau Siu-Kai (ed.) 
The First Tung Chee-hwa Administration: The First Five Years of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2002) at pages 353 and 368. 
43
 Wesley-Smith, “The Separation of Powers” (see note 34) at page 72. 
44
 Shiu Sin-por, “Executive-Legislative Relations Under the Basic Law” in Seminar on Review and 
Prospect of the Basic Law: Collection of Articles 2007 (Hong Kong: One Country Two Systems 
Research Institute, 2010) at page 272. 
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appointed to a position within the executive, as has happened on a number of 
occasions in recent years, the practice so far has always been for that legislator to 
resign both their membership of Legco and also any political party membership. So 
the only area of overlapping membership is the very small number of legislators 
appointed by the Chief Executive to sit on the Executive Council. 
This near total separation of persons between the executive and legislature has 
been identified by many writers as one of the contributing factors to the persistent 
discord and even “dysfunctional”45 relationship between the executive and legislature 
that has been such a persistent feature of Hong Kong’s post-1 July 1997 history. 
According to mainland drafters of the Hong Kong Basic Law, coordination between 
the executive and legislature was meant to be as important as the system of checks 
and balances, with Xiao (2001) describing them as “two sides of the same coin”.46 
However in a Constitutional Development Task Force report in 2004, the HKSAR 
Government described the separate membership of the executive and legislature as 
posing severe obstacles to such coordination: 
“[I]n reality, the executive authorities and the legislature are respectively taken 
up by people of different backgrounds and perspectives; the executive authorities 
and the legislature often are able to “regulate” (i.e. to act as a mutual check) but 
are not able to “co-ordinate” (i.e. to fully complement) each other. Furthermore, 
under the present system, the Chief Executive does not have established support 
in the Legislative Council. This has had an adverse effect on the executive-led 
system and administrative efficiency.”47  
Writing in 2006 Ip, who had served as a senior member of the executive and 
would subsequently become a legislator,48 suggested that “it has now become clear 
with hindsight, as the Basic Law drafters of the 1980s lacked in-depth understanding 
of the theory and practice of representative government, they basically cobbled 
together a constitutional system based on existing practice, and incorporated features 
borrowed from western systems of representative government”.49 
 
                                                 
45
 Ian Scott, “The Disarticulation of Hong Kong’s Post-Handover Political System” (2000) 43 The 
China Journal 29, 29. 
46
 Xiao, One Country, Two Systems: An Account of the Drafting of the Hong Kong Basic Law (see note 
22) at page 254. 
47
 HKSAR Government, The Second Report of the Constitutional Development Task Force : Issues of 
Principle in the Basic Law Relating to Constitutional Development (April 2004), at 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr03-04/english/panels/ca/papers/ca0416cb2-report2-e.pdf (last accessed on 
10 Sept 2014). 
48
 Ip was Secretary for Security, a principal official position in the Hong Kong SAR Government, from 
1998-2003. Since 2008, she has been a member of the Legislative Council and, since 2012, also a 
member of the Executive Council. 
49
 Regina Ip, Hong Kong: A Case Study in Democratic Development in Transitional Societies (Stanford 
University: MA thesis, 2006) at page 36. 
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Universal Suffrage and Other Possible Reforms 
The introduction of universal suffrage, especially for the selection of the Chief 
Executive, is often portrayed as the answer to the problems afflicting the executive-
legislative relationship in Hong Kong. Take, for example, this commentary which 
appeared in the state-run China Daily, unequivocally asserting that:  “There can be no 
argument that successful implementation of universal suffrage will give the city’s 
next top leader a stronger mandate that will enable him or her to implement policies 
more effectively.”50 Citing work by several authors including Ip (2006)51 and Ma 
(2007),52 Chen (2007) noted that: “Most scholars consider that full democratization is 
the way out of the predicament of governance in the HKSAR”.53 
It is not the intention of this paper to dispute the benefits that selecting Hong 
Kong’s Chief Executive through universal suffrage could bring, particularly in 
enhancing the Chief Executive’s legitimacy to rule in the eyes of the Hong Kong 
public. Nonetheless there is a danger that too heavy a focus on the issue of universal 
suffrage risks obscuring other issues that currently impact on the state of governance 
in Hong Kong. Salkeld (2014), a senior civil servant in the HKSAR Government, 
notes that: “Today we see the relationship between the Chief Executive and the 
legislature through the distorting lens of the unfinished business over electoral 
arrangements.”54 He points out that, even in the event that agreement could be 
reached on the introduction of universal suffrage for the election of the Chief 
Executive and all seats in the legislature, “the American style constitutional divorce 
between Chief Executive and the legislature will remain since it is embedded in the 
Basic Law”.55 
In particular, it would be a mistake to see the introduction of universal suffrage as 
the solution to the currently dysfunctional relationship between the executive and 
legislature, unless accompanied by other reforms to address the structural issues 
associated with the near total separation of the personnel of these two branches of 
government. Given the diminishing prospects for securing the two-thirds majority in 
Legco necessary for changing the system of selecting the Chief Executive,56 these are 
reforms which could also be usefully pursued even in the absence of the introduction 
of universal suffrage. 
Experience overseas suggests that universal suffrage may not necessarily lead to 
a well-functioning relationship between the executive and legislature, particularly 
where the membership of the two branches is rigidly separated from one another.  
That is certainly the belief of a substantial body of prominent academic critics of the 
                                                 
50
 “Let Political Wisdom Prevail,” China Daily, 3 June 2015. 
51
 Ip (see note 49). 
52
 Ma Ngok, Political Development in Hong Kong: State, Political Society and Civil Society (Hong 
Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2007). 
53
 Albert HY Chen, “The Basic Law and the Development of the Political System in Hong Kong” 
(2007) 15 (1) APLR 19, 29. 
54
 Salkeld has served as head of the HKSAR Government’s Efficiency Unit since 2009. See Kim 
Salkeld, “Should Hong Kong Public Services Change? Can They?”, Public Policy Forum at the Faculty 
of Social Sciences of the University of Hong Kong, 3 December 2014. Available at 
http://www.socsc.hku.hk/pppl/ksalk/video.html (last accessed on 19 January 2015). 
55
 Ibid. 
56
 As required under Annex I(7) of the Hong Kong Basic Law.  
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near total separation of the membership of the executive and legislature in the US. 
Such criticisms were famously highlighted in 2005 when the widely-watched 
American TV political drama The West Wing cited a fictional US Presidential advisor 
as suggesting that “[h]alf the Faculty at Yale law” blame American-style separation of 
powers “for wreaking havoc on over 30 countries around the globe”.57 It followed 
Professor Bruce Ackerman’s influential Harvard Law Review article in 2000 titled 
“The New Separation of Powers”,58 in which he paraphrased fellow Yale Professor 
Juan José Linz as describing such separation of powers as “one of America’s most 
dangerous exports”.59 
Linz (1994) had warned of the “nightmare scenario” of constitutional collapse, in 
which continual conflicts between a rigidly separated executive and legislature 
ultimately encourage one side to resolve the deadlock by dismantling the 
constitutional structure.60 However, of more direct relevance in the Hong Kong 
context would be Ackerman’s (2000) alternative scenario of such continual conflicts 
instead resulting in prolonged deadlock: 
 “Rather than all out war, president and house may merely indulge a taste for 
endless backbiting, mutual recrimination, and partisan deadlock. Worse yet, the 
contending powers may use the constitutional tools at their disposal to make life 
miserable for each other: the house will harass the executive, and the president 
will engage in unilateral action whenever he can get away with it. I call this 
scenario the ‘crisis in governability’.”61 
Substitute the words “Chief Executive” for “president” and “Legislative Council” 
for “house” and many might see in this an accurate description of the “crisis in 
governability” that currently exists in Hong Kong. That might, in turn, suggest that 
the solution lies in a total overhaul of the constitutional structure in the Hong Kong 
Basic Law to replace the present separation of the membership of the executive and 
legislature with something closer to a parliamentary system 
That is the solution advocated in the American context by Ackerman (2000) and 
other critics of the US presidential system, who favour abandoning it in favour of a 
system of “constrained parliamentarianism” in which checks and balances would be 
preserved through other means.62 Also writing about the system in the US, Wilson 
(1996) notes that: “If one makes a list of the most frequently proposed alterations to 
                                                 
57
 “The Wake Up Call” (The West Wing, Season 6, Episode 14, aired on 9 February 2005). Available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gLoio0Z6jLw  (last accessed on 29 August 2014). 
58
 Bruce Ackerman, “The New Separation of Powers” (2000) 113 Harv. L. Rev. 633-729. 
59
 Ibid. at pages 644-645. 
60
 Juan J. Linz, “Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?” in Juan J. Linz 
and Arturo Valenzuela, The Failure of Presidential Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1994) at pages 3-90. See, however, the rebuttal by Matthew S. Shugart, and John Carey, [in 
Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992) at page 42] who found “no justification for the claim of Linz and others that 
presidentialism is inherently prone to crises that lead to breakdown”. 
61
 Ackerman “The New Separation of Powers” (see note 58) at page 646. 
62
 Ibid. at page 727. 
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our constitutional arrangements, the odds are high that these proposals will call for a 
reduction in the separation of powers”.63 
Similar structural reforms have sometimes been advocated in Hong Kong. 
According to Ip (2006): “As the parliamentary system provides greater assurance of 
an executive-led government, the Basic Law should be amended to provide for the 
implementation of the equivalent of a parliamentary system”.64 Civic Party lawmaker 
Alan Leong advocated the introduction of a parliamentary system during his 
unsuccessful candidacy for Chief Executive in 2007.65 
However the option of moving to a parliamentary system was rejected during the 
drafting of the Hong Kong Basic Law.66 It is perhaps just conceivable that experience 
of the prolonged constitutional deadlock under the current rigid separation of 
membership of the executive and legislature might eventually prompt mainland 
scholars and officials to reconsider the merits of a parliamentary system as an 
alternative to the present deadlock. Noted political sociologist Larry Diamond 
recently sought to encourage precisely such a rethink: “If Beijing is worried about 
unfettered populism and polarisation, switching to a parliamentary system would 
provide a better and safer model”.67 
But there is no sign of such a rethink as yet and, given the strong presence of the 
pan-democracy camp in Legco, the central authorities could be expected to be 
intensely suspicious of any move towards a system that might increase the power that 
members of the legislature wield over the executive. In any case, given the extensive 
amendments to the Hong Kong Basic Law that would be necessary to introduce a 
parliamentary system, such a reform could only be regarded as a long-term goal at 
best. 
Allowing the Chief Executive to be a member of a political party is sometimes 
suggested as a more immediate step that could accompany the introduction of 
universal suffrage and help bridge the disconnect between the executive and 
legislature. Several local political party leaders have been frequently mentioned as 
potential candidates for Chief Executive in 2017 and beyond.68 It is sometimes 
suggested that allowing such politicians to retain their party membership, were they 
successfully elected, would make it easier for them to secure support for government 
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policies from party colleagues in the legislature.69 Former Chief Executive Tung Chee 
hwa has recently appeared to endorse this view.70 
At present, although candidates can retain their party membership while standing 
for election, the Chief Executive Election Ordinance (Cap. 569) requires anyone 
successfully elected as Chief Executive to relinquish any political party membership 
and promise not to join any party for the duration of their term of office.71 Since this 
prohibition is only written into Hong Kong legislation, in theory it should be easier to 
change than other structural reforms requiring amendments to the Hong Kong Basic 
Law. However China might well question whether permitting political party 
membership would be consistent with the Chief Executive’s obligation of 
accountability to the Central People’s Government.72 Nor does such a reform seem on 
the agenda at present, with the Hong Kong SAR Government noting that the issue 
attracted relatively little discussion during its first-stage public consultation exercise 
on possible reforms to the electoral system for 2016-2017.73 
In any case, there is reason to question how big a difference allowing the Chief 
Executive to be a member of a political party would necessarily make to the 
executive-legislative relationship. First of all, under the current electoral system it is 
extremely unlikely that any one political party could ever command a majority of 
seats in Legco. That means any Chief Executive who retained their political party 
membership could, at best, count on the support of a minority of party colleagues 
within the legislature 
Even this is open to question. Experience overseas suggests that where there is a 
rigid separation of the membership of the executive and legislature, the political 
interests of party members in the legislature frequently differ fundamentally from 
those of the head of the executive, even where they come from the same political 
party. Samuels and Shugart (2010), authors of the most sustained research in this area, 
put the point as follows: “[S]eparate election of the executive and legislative branches 
of government enhances the incentives for politicians in different branches of the same 
party to go their own way. … This mutually assured survival in office means that 
neither ‘branch’ of a single party is bound to support the other as in a parliamentary 
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system. In this way, the constitutional separation of powers provides a recipe for 
intraparty conflict.”74  
Samuels and Shugart’s (2010) rather gloomy conclusion is that responsible party 
government simply “cannot exist under the separation of powers”. Instead, 
“irresponsible parties are the likely result” of any system of separation of origin and 
survival as far as members of the executive and legislature are concerned.75 
That brings us back to the structural problems posed by total separation of the 
membership of the executive from the legislature, particularly in terms of the resulting 
difference in political self-interest of the members of these two bodies. Even if the 
wholesale introduction of a parliamentary system has to be considered impractical, at 
least in the short-term, that need not necessarily preclude the introduction of some 
elements associated with such a system—with the goal of trying to reduce the extent 
of the separation between the two branches of the political structure. Foreseeing the 
problems that Chief Executives would experience in trying to govern Hong Kong 
under a system which separated membership of the legislature from the executive, 
Ghai (1999) predicted that “the executive may consequently be forced into operating 
the political system in less of a presidential and more of a parliamentary style”.76 He 
suggested this might involve either appointing legislators to Exco, specifically those 
from the biggest political parties or coalition of parties, or bringing legislators directly 
into the heart of the executive by appointing them as principal officials.77  
Taking Ghai’s second option first, nominating legislators to top governmental 
posts78 might go some way towards addressing the structural problem highlighted by 
Samuels and Shugart of separation of survival of members of the executive and 
legislature under a presidential-like system. Although formally speaking, such 
legislators would still be elected separately from the executive, in practical terms their 
political fortunes would then become closely entwined with those of the executive. 
Such an option might prove particularly attractive for a Chief Executive elected by 
universal suffrage, providing not only a loyal core of supporters in Legco but also a 
means of deflecting criticism of heading an administration of unelected appointees. 
That rationale might become even stronger if a Chief Executive was facing 
accusations of having been elected through a system of “fake” universal suffrage, 
providing an opportunity for a Chief Executive to burnish their democratic credentials 
by surrounding themselves with a layer of elected officials. 
Appointing members of Legco to principal official posts could also be seen as an 
evolutionary rather than revolutionary reform, given the long track record of 
appointing legislators to such posts79—with the crucial difference being that, until 
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now, such appointees have always been expected to resign as legislators upon being 
appointed. However there would be practical obstacles to such a reform. Some 
principal official positions should not be filled by legislators, especially those related 
to law enforcement and auditing, to avoid politicising such activities.80 Similar 
arguments might also be advanced in respect of the positions of Secretary for the Civil 
Service and Secretary for Justice.81 
A more fundamental objection is the provision in Article 79(4) of the Hong Kong 
Basic Law barring any legislator from remaining as a member of the council: “When 
he or she accepts a government appointment and becomes a public servant” (emphasis 
added). It seems clear from the wording of this provision that taking up a government 
post does not, in itself, disqualify a legislator from remaining in Legco—with the 
crucial issue being whether or not they are classified as a “public servant” for the 
purposes of the Hong Kong Basic Law.  The term public servant is not defined in the 
Hong Kong Basic Law, and Ghai (1999) notes “there is nothing which explicitly 
requires a principal official to be a public servant”.82 However, although not explicit, 
there are provisions in the Hong Kong Basic Law which are indicative of such a 
requirement83 As such, it would appear unsafe for serving legislators to be appointed 
as principal officials, unless and until Article 79(4) is amended or interpreted to make 
its ambit clearer.84   
No such constitutional obstacles stand in the way of Ghai’s first option, that of 
appointing to Exco legislators representing the largest political groupings in Exco—
something which has already been attempted on a limited scale. Indeed the 
appointment of at least some legislators to Exco is specifically envisaged under 
Article 55(1) of the Hong Kong Basic Law, which refers to members of the Executive 
Council being chosen “from among the principal officials of the executive authorities, 
members of the Legislative Council and public figures”. 
Cross-membership between the Executive and Legislative Councils has a long 
history in Hong Kong, with legislators dominating the unofficial (or non-government) 
membership of Exco for more than three decades during the colonial era. Throughout 
most of the period from 1946, when such cross-membership began, until it ended in 
1992, legislators constituted between half and three quarters of such unofficial 
members.85 Tai (2011) describes it as “a bridge between the Executive and Legco”86 
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which played a significant role in averting conflict between the executive and 
legislature during much of Hong Kong’s colonial era. Controversial government 
proposals were sometimes shelved when legislators sitting in Exco warned that they 
would likely face a hostile response from their colleagues in Legco.87 Miners (1991) 
attributes the rarity with which the legislature rejected government bills during the 
colonial era to their prior vetting by Exco.88 
It is an irony of Hong Kong’s constitutional development that this cross-
membership should have been ended at precisely the moment when it became 
potentially most important, while Hong Kong was in the final stages of the transition 
to a fully-elected Legco where the executive would, almost inevitably, face more 
difficulty securing support for its policies. It was Chris Patten who broke the decades-
long cross-membership between the two councils, in his first policy address after 
assuming the post of last colonial Governor in 1992.89 Patten did this for essentially 
short-term political reasons, because continuing such cross-membership would have 
inevitably led to the appointment of some pro-democracy legislators to Exco, a move 
which would have brought a furious response from China.90 Indeed he dropped a 
strong hint that ending cross-membership was initially only intended as a temporary 
measure, announcing a separation the membership of the two councils “for the time 
being”.91 
Patten’s 1992 policy address recognised the need to build an alternative bridge 
between the executive and Legco to replace the one he was demolishing through the 
abolition of cross-membership, proposing in its place the creation of a Government-
LegCo Committee with “the vital task of creating an effective working relationship 
between this Council and the Administration”.92 This interesting proposal, which 
might usefully be revisited today, proposed the establishment of a committee chaired 
by either the Governor, Chief Secretary or Financial Secretary, depending on the 
subject matter under discussion, which would meet regularly with a representative 
group of legislators to discuss how the Government’s legislative and financial 
programmes could be conducted more efficiently.93 
But the Government-LegCo Committee collapsed even before it came into 
existence, amid bickering among legislators about its composition. And Patten’s 
proposed short-term separation of the two councils subsequently turned into a 
prolonged long-distance relationship. As a result, Scott (2000) concluded that Patten’s 
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1992 “decision contributed considerably to the subsequent disarticulated system” and 
“the continuing disjunction between the work of the two councils”.94 
Although the total separation of the membership of the two councils was reversed 
after the establishment of the HKSAR, legislators have never yet returned to Exco in 
anything like the same numbers, or with the same dominance, as was the case during 
the many decades when they served as a “bridge” between the two bodies during the 
colonial era. No Executive Council since 1 July 1997 has ever had more than three 
legislators among its ranks and, given the growth in the size of Exco, these legislators 
constitute a much smaller proportion of its total membership—currently just over 
20% of the unofficial members of Exco.95 
It is difficult to believe efforts to build bridge with Legco through overlapping 
membership are being pursued with much seriousness when a new Chief Executive 
initially appoints as many members of his campaign team to Exco as legislators.96 Or 
that such appointments form part of a serious strategy to secure support from the 
larger political grouping in Legco when Regina Ip is given a seat on Exco—whose 
New People’s Party has only two seats in Legco—while the generally pro-
establishment Liberal Party is ignored, despite having four seats, or twice as large a 
presence in Legco.  
Any serious strategy of using such appointments to build bridges with the 
legislature would have to include offering places on Exco to all political parties with a 
significant presence in Legco. That would mean reaching out to mainstream groups 
within the pan-democratic camp, such as the Democratic Party and the Civic Party. 
Since such groups would be unlikely to accept the collective responsibility rule as it 
has been traditionally practised in Exco, that rule would need to be reviewed. 
However if a minimum threshold of say five seats in Legco was required before any 
party was offered a seat on Exco, that would exclude more radical pan-democratic 
groups whose presence would be presumably considered beyond the pale. 
It would, of course, be a mistake to automatically assume that simply because a 
strategy of appointing legislators as the dominant unofficial grouping in Exco 
contributed to a smoother executive-legislative relationship many decades ago, at a 
time when the members of the legislature were appointed by the executive, the same 
strategy would necessarily have the same effect in today’s very different environment. 
Nonetheless there would appear to be little harm in trying and of all the options for 
trying to bridge the executive-legislative divide considered in this article it would 
appear to be the most realistic in the short-term. 
Even a future Chief Executive elected by universal suffrage would still need to 
secure support for government policies from legislators whose political fortunes are 
not automatically tied to the Chief Executive, and bringing more of them into Exco 
would be one way of seeking to achieve this. 
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Conclusion 
It should be stressed once again that it is not the intention of this paper to diminish the 
role that the introduction of universal suffrage for the election of the Chief Executive 
would play in addressing the current problems with Hong Kong’s political system. 
But, for all its importance, universal suffrage would be unlikely to solve those 
problems alone, unless it is part of a package of reforms that also address the 
structural problems caused by the near total separation of the membership of the 
executive and legislature. While it would be far preferable for those reforms to be 
implemented together as a package, the fact that it may ultimately prove impossible to 
proceed with any one part of that package—even a part as important as universal 
suffrage—should not necessarily preclude efforts to move forward on other fronts. 
However it would be wise to be realistic about the limits of what can be achieved, 
even if such reforms can be implemented in their entirety, universal suffrage and all. 
Separation of powers, especially in the form which it is practised in Hong Kong, is 
not a doctrine which lends itself naturally to a smooth working relationship between 
the executive and legislature. Brandeis J. put the point most aptly in Myers v United 
States (1926), pointing out that the doctrine was adopted in the US Constitution, “not 
to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose 
was not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the 
distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people 
from autocracy”.97 
Some degree of friction is even more inevitable in the special circumstances in 
which Hong Kong finds itself, with one country two systems imposing certain 
constraints on what type of political system Hong Kong can adopt. As Chen (2007) 
notes: “To keep this strange political animal alive, Hong Kong may have to pay the 
price of having a system of governance that is less than healthy and effective”.98 Nor 
is a certain degree of friction necessarily undesirable. Few would wish to see a 
situation where the legislature agreed with the executive on everything, and the 
checks and balances between the two institutions evaporated. As Ma (2002) notes: 
“Executive—legislative relations are most ‘harmonious’ in places where the executive 
can largely control the legislature, as in one-party dictatorships and oligarchies in 
Africa or Middle East.”99 
But, while perfect harmony might be undesirable, most would agree that the 
situation in Hong Kong has swung too far in the opposite direction towards continual 
executive-legislative conflict at present. While being realistic about the limits of any 
reform, Hong Kong can do better—and addressing the issues raised by our system of 
separation of powers deserve to be considered in tandem with the introduction of 
universal suffrage. 
                                                 
97
 (1926) 272 U.S. 52, 293. 
98
 Chen, “The Basic Law and the Development of the Political System in Hong Kong” (see note 53) at 
page 40. 
99
 Ma Ngok, “Executive-Legislative Relations: Assessing Legislative Influence in an Executive-
Dominant System” (see note 42) at pages 354-355. 
